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During its summit, the European Council broke the deadlock regarding the Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF), Next Generation EU and the Rule of Law (RoL)
Regulation. In this analysis, we focus on the EUCO Conclusions, notably on the
‘interpretative declaration on the new rule of law mechanism’ (section 1).  Originally
crafted by the German Presidency in close contact with Budapest and Warsaw, this text
has enabled the EU25 to overcome the veto posed by Hungary and Poland on the
adoption of the entire package, thus reaching a ‘mutually satisfactory solution’. In its
unusual declaration, the European Council agreed that “the Commission intends to
develop and adopt guidelines on the way it will apply the Regulation” and that “[u]ntil
such guidelines are finalised, the Commission will not propose measures under the
Regulation.” As to when these guidelines may be deemed to be finalized, the European
Council agreed that “[s]hould an action for annulment be introduced with regard to the
Regulation, the guidelines will be finalised after the judgment of the Court of Justice.”
We argue that despite its political nature, this interpretative declaration entails major
legal consequences. At a deeper level, it also shows an unprecedented disregard for the
rule of law, and its principles and corollaries, governing the Union. Let’s translate these
into more intelligible terms offered by a national legal order. When looking at it through
the prism of the nation state, this declaration amounts to a scenario in which the head
of state agrees with the executive to suspend the application of a legislative act until the
Constitutional Court has greenlighted it. This in a context in which this judicial review
has no automatic suspensory effect (Art. 278 TFEU). Everyone sees how this would be
legally questionable and the situation is no different when this scenario plays out in the
EU, rather than a national, legal order. Here’s why:
As we will show first, in adopting these Conclusions, the European Council acted ultra
vires. Second, it infringed on the principle of institutional balance by undermining the
prerogatives of the Parliament, Council, Commission and Court of Justice. We identify
the Parliament as the most obvious candidate to row back against this illegitimate
executive competence creep. To this end, it has some options at its disposal. One of
these options is to challenge the EUCO’s interpretative declaration before the Court of
Justice. While some commentators have complacently dismissed the recent EUCO’s
interpretative declaration as a mere political, non-binding statement, we will argue in a
last section how the declaration is a challengeable act under Article 263 TFEU given
that it does produce very legal effects.​
Ultra vires
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Under Article 15(1) TEU, the EUCO shall not exercise legislative functions. Moreover,
like any other EU institutions, it must “act within the limits of the powers conferred on
it in the Treaties […] and practice mutual sincere cooperation” (Article 13(2) TEU).
Under Articles 14(1) and 16(1) TEU, legislative functions are instead to be exercised by
the Parliament and Council, depending on the legal basis. The draft RoL Regulation has
Article 322(1)(a) TFEU as a legal basis, which prescribes the ordinary legislative
procedure. By requiring the Commission to adopt guidelines (not per se foreseen in
Article 5 of the RoL Regulation) and conditioning the application of the mechanism to
the finalisation of such guidelines, the EUCO has de facto amended a (draft) legislative
act (by analogy, see Ville de Paris v. EU Commission, para. 128). Yet the EUCO has no
such power (Article 15(1) TEU), and has therefore no role under the ordinary legislative
procedure.
Moreover, the EUCO amendment does not only concern the procedure through which
measures may be imposed on Member States, but also the effective date from which the
mechanism can be applied. However, the latter, temporal, element is an essential
element of legislation (according to the Council Legal Service, see para. 7) on which the
EU legislature must take an explicit decision itself (paras 46-47). As the dies a quo for
the mechanism to be applied entails a political choice to be made, neither the
Commission alone (Article 290 TFEU), nor a fortiori the EUCO (Article 15(1) TEU)
could arrogate this power. But there is more. As this power belongs to the Parliament
and Council, the European Council did not only act ultra vires, but also infringed those
institutions’ prerogatives and, as a result, the principle of institutional balance under
Article 13(2) TEU.
The principle of institutional balance
A further, even more insidious, violation of the principle of institutional balance relates
to the powers of the Court of Justice. Here it may be recalled that the European Council
did not directly decide on the suspension of the application of the rule of law
mechanism. The suspension will result from the action for annulment that Poland and
Hungary have announced they will bring. Even if the President of the Court can of his
own motion, or at the request of the Parliament and Council, decide that the case will go
through the expedited procedure (Art. 133(3) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure), the
application will be delayed for several months. The EUCO conclusions containing the
interpretative declaration thus effectively give suspensive effect to an action for
annulment. Yet, under Article 278 TFEU, “actions brought before the Court of Justice of
the European Union shall not have suspensory effect”, and proceedings under Article
263 TFEU are no exception. This is a decision that only the Court of Justice can take.
Last but not least, the interpretative declaration also encroaches upon the Commission’s
prerogatives. While the European Council can give the EU the necessary impetus, and
thus for instance invite the European Commission to table proposals or take initiatives
(as it often does), it cannot give any instructions. This is explicitly reflected in Article
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17(3) TEU, which states that “in carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall
be completely independent” and its members “shall neither seek nor take instructions
from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity”. Yet that’s exactly what
the EUCO attempted to do, thereby infringing the principle of institutional balance.
Even if the EUCO would invoke an established practice to ‘task’ the Commission, it is
established jurisprudence of the Court that practice cannot override the Treaty
provisions (Commission v Council, para. 42). Further on this point, it is worth noting
that, perniciously enough, the interpretative declaration in paragraph 3 (“The Council
welcomes the Commission’s intention to adopt a Declaration”) makes the Commission
bind itself to the very same content of the declaration. This is where the political
declaration acquires a legally relevant nature. Under the principle of patere legem
quam ipse fecisti, the Commission finds itself closely intertwined with the very same
interpretative declaration impinging upon its own prerogatives. In other words, it
commits itself to formalise in the very same underlying Rule of Law Regulation –
through a Declaration – the de facto amendments (paragraph 2 from let. a) to k))
contained in the EUCO interpretative declarations. The EU Commission Declaration is
the equivalent of a legal hara-kiri committed by the Commission’s own jurists. This
Declaration is also set to emerge as the most tangible manifestation of the violation of
the principle of institutional balance.
What’s next
The rather cynical conclusion is that the EUCO’s brinkmanship in ‘saving’ the rule of
law mechanism results in a violation of the checks and balances of the EU legal order
and hence of the rule of law.
Which scenarios can then be envisaged to ensure the full application of the Rule of Law
Regulation and remedy the breaches of the EU’s system of checks and balances?
A first approach, which is dominating the public discourse, is for the European
Parliament to simply ignore the EUCO Conclusions and to take the principled position
that only the actual text of the Regulation matters. It could – similarly to the
Commission, but this time sua sponte – adopt a Declaration to be annexed to the
Regulation stating the obvious:
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1. 
the Regulation, like all EU legislation, should be implemented timely (as of
its entry into force) and in good faith by all relevant actors (European
Commission and Member States included), as per Articles 4(3), 13(2) and
17(1) TEU;
it is the Commission’s duty, as guardian of the Treaty, to implement the
mechanism in compliance with the terms of the Regulation and, in light of
its independence under Article 17(3) TEU, without succumbing to political
pressure from the European Council, other institutions or Member States;
it reserves the right to itself to institute an action for failure to act, under
Article 265 TFEU, if the Commission does not take the measures required
under the Regulation. This might enable the Parliament to denounce the
‘chill’ effect the EUCO interpretative statement is set to produce on the
Commission insofar as such a statement has significantly reframed the RoL
Regulation as originally drafted and negotiated. Think of let. c) that makes
triggering of the mechanism conditional upon the adoption of Commission’s
guidelines; let. d), presenting the new mechanism is presented as of last
resort; let f), excluding generalized deficiencies, etc).
A second approach is more daring and would see the European Parliament file an action
for annulment under Article 263 TFEU against the EUCO’s interpretative declaration.
This would be legally possible since the EUCO conclusions, notably the interpretative
statement, constitute a reviewable legal act under Article 263 TFEU. Indeed, since
AETR, it is well established case law of the Court that what matters is whether the
contested act is intended to have legal effects. As demonstrated above, the EUCO
interpretative statement aim to change the way in which the Rule of Law Regulation will
be applied and the timing, which qualifies as intending to have legal effects. A
counterargument here could be that the EUCO conclusions being, by their nature,
political statements without legal value and therefore without legal effects, would not be
reviewable and any action against them would be rejected as inadmissible. This
formalistic reading of the interpretative declaration underpins the approach currently
undertaken by the EU Parliament, and most commentators. Yet, taking a more realistic
approach would have us recognize that by becoming increasingly dominant in the EU’s
institutional setup the European Council no longer limits itself to merely giving political
impetus to the integration project. And while the Court of Justice in Slovakia &
Hungary v. Council rejected that secondary legislation establishing the mandatory
relocation mechanism could be annulled for contravening EUCO Conclusions (para.
145), it acknowledged that these documents can produce some legal effects, and
therefore are legally relevant. This since it held that those conclusions had been
‘implemented’ through the adoption of the voluntary relocation mechanism, thus
suggesting that European Council’s conclusions had thereby exhausted their legal force
(para. 144).
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Regardless, even if the EUCO were to insist that its Conclusions are non-binding and
the Court would accept this, it would not necessarily result in the inadmissibility of the
Parliament’s action. The Court in France v. Commission (para. 40) rejected “the
Commission’s argument that the fact that a measure […] is not binding is sufficient to
confer on that institution the competence to adopt it. Determining the conditions under
which such a measure may be adopted requires that the division of powers and the
institutional balance established by the Treaty […] be duly taken into account.” As noted
by AG Sharpston in the Swiss Memorandum case (paras 57-62), the Court seems
“prepared to be less rigorous on admissibility in interinstitutional disputes where an
important issue of principle needs to be resolved.”
A third, and ideal scenario, would try to reconcile – at the time of adoption of the new
ruled of law mechanism – the EUCO interpretative declaration and the actual RoL
Regulation. This is left to the loyal cooperation of the EU Commission while adopting
the act.
Conclusions
The interpretative declaration of 10 December 2020 is set to go down in history as a
dark page for the rule of law in the Union legal order. Regardless of whether this
document will be challenged before Court in the coming sixty days, it represents an
unprecedented attempt by the Member States – gathered within the European Council
– to disregard the rule of law as their dominant organisation principle. The Union being
a “Community based on the rule of law”, its members paradoxically seem to have
damaged the Union in their effort to save it.  Not only the Rule of Law Regulation finds
itself in an unprecedented legal limbo, but as a result of the European Council’s
interventions this mechanism has also been reframed, with the Commission’s tacit
assent, under new terms that might relegate it into yet another rule of law oversight
ghost.
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